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M a u r i t a n i a
R AH AL  B OU B R I K
Since the early 1980s, the ideological landscape of Mau-
ritania, dominated by an elite that originated from the
political struggle for independence, has fallen into
decline. In a time of economic, social, and political crisis,
neither the political elite nor the military was capable of
meeting the expectations of Mauritanian society. The
modernist projects, timidly undertaken since the inde-
pendence, only reinforced economic and cultural
dependency on the Western model. The failure of the
national elite was blatant, and new social frameworks
began to emerge in order to end the Ôstate of graceÕ
enjoyed by the political power at the time. 
T r a d i t i o n a l
ÔMen of ReligionÕ
and Political Power
i n M a u r i t a n i a
From the beginning of the 1980s, and espe-
cially with the advent of political pluralism, reli-
gion became more than ever central to politi-
cal, social, cultural, and identity-related issues
in Mauritania. A Ôreligion of contestationÕ would
gain territory not only by criticizing the political
power-holders and the moral ÔdriftingÕ of soci-
ety, but also by opposing other traditional reli-
gious representations of Islam. This conjunc-
tion provoked the returning to force of tradi-
tional models, either because those involved in
these latter were looking to defend their sym-
bolic space of action, or because they were
reactivated by the political power to counteract
the emergence of a militant Islam, which
threatened the established order.1
In denouncing the use of religion in politics
under the pretext that the law forbade political
parties based on religion: ÔIslam can not be the
exclusive prerogative of a political partyÕ,2
those in power did not abstain from using reli-
gious personalities to reinforce their political
legitimacy. The creation of an official institution
echoed this; on 16 February 1992, a decree was
promulgated concerning the organization and
functioning of the ÔIslamic High CouncilÕ (HCI Ð
Haut Conseil Islamique), a body which had
already been announced in article 94 of the
1991 constitution. The five members of the
Council were appointed by the president, all
belonging to tradition milieus: f u q a h  Õ a n d
leaders of brotherhoods. The president was
Mohamed Salam Ould Addoud, descendant of
an influential and educated family from Trarza,
whose m a h d r a (traditional school) was one of
the best known in the country. Addoud situat-
ed his official role in the HCI within the conser-
vative sunni tradition, which had managed the
rapport between scholar and monarch: ÔSince
the end of the reign of the four rashidun Califs,
all the sovereigns lacked the necessary con-
duct. There were the just, but there were also
the shameless. There were always pious schol-
ars and guides at their side. All maintained,
with the regime in power, relations based on
integrity, devotion and the accomplishment of
duty. They occupied various positions: judges,
imams, guides, gatherers (É). They would give
no credit to the lies of a sovereign, just as they
would not validate his abuses. Nonetheless,
they would not seek to plot against him, nor
would they seek to incite disorder and anarchy
to influence the scene. They limited themselves
to enjoining people to do good and forbidding
them to commit reprehensible acts.Õ3
Pesident Ould Taya furthermore relied on
independent religious figures, such as Boud-
dah Ould Bousayri, imam of the principle
mosque of Nouakchott who had distinguished
himself since the eighties by his preaching,
which was then to be heard on the radio each
Friday. He was considered the unofficial advisor
to the president. It was he who advocated
peace at the time of the call to j i h  d , l a u n c h e d
by Islamist leader Ould Sidi Yahya on the eve of
the rejection of his partyÕs (Omma) legislation
(18 November 1991).4 Still in his role as media-
tor between civil society and the authorities, he
intervened in the arrests of Islamist youths in
1994 and asked the president, during a Friday
sermon, to be merciful towards them. The pres-
ident conceded. Moreover, according to certain
sources, it was Ould Taya who asked the imamÕs
intervention to resolve the crisis.5 The political
power thus made pragmatic choices and relied
on traditional religious personalities without,
however, allowing them the opportunity to
develop a notoriety that could go beyond its
control. 
The second category of men of religion to
which the authorities would turn to were the
leaders of brotherhoods, who until then had
been kept at a distance. With the indepen-
dence, the State, while opting for Islam, careful-
ly referred to its scriptural aspect, other expres-
sions and models being excluded indirectly.
This concealed its will to limit the influence of
other traditional religious actors, notably the
brotherhood leaders. These latter were deni-
grated and denounced officially by the state
party at the time (Mauritanian PeopleÕs Party) at
its 1968 congress.6
The marginalized brotherhood leaders of the
post-colonial period were to return to the
national political scene with the regional politi-
cal crisis and the introduction of a multi-party
system. During the blood-shattering events of
1989 between Senegal and Mauritania, the
leaders were to play an important role in the
reconciliation between the two countries. In
fact, the ties of brotherhood between the two
banks of the Senegal River are century-old. The
descendants of the Moorish s h a y k h ( s ), who had
conquered a large population in Senegal at the
beginning of the century, had retained close
ties with their followers. Belonging to a broth-
erhood was more powerful and more concrete
than belonging to a nation. The annual pilgrim-
ages made by the faithful to the holy places of
their brotherhood leaders were the expression
of permanent spiritual connections. This
transnational and trans-ethnic spiritual estab-
lishment allowed the network of brotherhoods
to actively involve itself in the bloody conflict
between the black-African community and the
Moorish community. Following the 1989
events, and before the opening of the official
borders, the s h a y k h brotherhoods worked for
reconciliation, not only by official means, but
also from the base. Relations between the
shaykh(s) and their disciples from the two
banks remained intact despite ethnic tensions.
The transnational position of the brotherhood
leaders earned them such sobriquets as Ôthe
man who traverses the two banksÕ, attributed
to Shaykh Abd al-Aziz Ould Talib Bouya Ould
Saad Bouh when the following question was
posed to Shaykh Mohamadou Ould Hamahul-
lh Ð son of the founder of Hamallism: 7 Ô O f
what nationality are you (Malian or Mauritan-
ian)?Õ; he responded: ÔMy nationality is my
brotherhood (t a r i q a) and all my disciples are of
the same nationality as I amÕ .8
In the past few years, the brotherhoods have
begun to conquer urban areas. They opened
z  w i y y a in the form of traditional educational
centres in the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadi-
bou. Although the brotherhood leaders are rel-
atively reticent towards politicians, they have
become involved during elections. They were
approached from all sides by parties and politi-
cal personalities to take advantage of the polit-
ical influence they had to offer. However, in
majority, they supported those (already) in
power. The son of Hamahullh, Shaykh
Muhammadou declared: ÔAhmed Ould Daddah
[president of the UFD: opposition party] came
to see me. Hamdi [Hamdi Ould Maknas presi-
dent of the PPD: opposition party] phoned me.
I have his written request for my support. I d e d-
icated prayers to him, as I did for Ahmed Ould
Daddah and Mouawiya Ould Sid'Ahmd Taya
(PRDS: Parti Republique Democratique et
Social]. We are above these political dividesÕ. 9
This displayed neutrality is only superficial, as
indicated by the s h a y k h himself when he then
stated: ÔThe people of this village asked me to
advise them in their choice amongst the newly
emerging parties. I suggested they go to the
PRDS for the following reasons: 1 Ð Its leader is
the leader of the State. He won the presidential
elections and is more experienced than the
others. 2 Ð He holds something in his hands, as
opposed to someone who is seekingÕ. 1 0 The vil-
lages under the direct influence of the Qdir
brotherhood leaders as well as the Tijn vote
massively in favour of the party in power, PRDS.
The pluralism and opening of the Ð electoral Ð
political arena facilitated the emergence of tra-
ditional leaders as important actors on the local
and national political scene. The f u q a h  Õ, the
brotherhood leaders and tribal leaders were
mobilized, above all, for electoral purposes.
These three principal actors coordinated their
work in certain domains, all the while remain-
ing in competition and rivalry in order to obtain
maximal advantages in return for their service.
For this reason, the alliances were often tempo-
rary and vague. It should be noted that the trib-
al factor was very decisive in these alliances,
especially during the elections.
The traditional religious body is not homoge-
nous, religious dignitaries grant their support
to one political party or another, depending on
their personal interests. They react in a social
tribal framework, and often play the role of
intermediary between political forces and their
own tribes, at times in coordination, at others in
competition, with tribal leaders. The support
that some amongst them granted to the state
party or to the opposition is situated more
within a traditional alliance between notables
than it is in an explicit political alliance. This
attitude is not unique to traditional followers of
religion; it is also the attitude of modernist
political personalities and the vast majority of
the young intellectual elite. The leaders of
political parties played the game; the most pro-
gressive amongst them and the most critical
towards tribalism turned to tribal alliances dur-
ing their electoral campaigns.
The conservative f u q a h  Õ and the leaders of
brotherhoods in majority chose for those
already in power. While preaching a fundamen-
talist religious discourse strongly opposed to
the Westernization of customs, they remained
critical of militant Islam. They felt the threat
represented by the new movements focusing
on the young generation. Also, they situated
their political and social actions in a new reli-
gious register. The Islamists, on their side,
avoided direct confrontation with the f u q a h  Õ
and brotherhood leaders. Nonetheless, they
marked their distance with the religious inter-
pretations and practices of that milieu; the dec-
larations of certain streams in this respect are
an open discrediting of the traditional religious
order. 
Thus the ulamas are accused of being Ôofficial
clerics good for legitimating any governmental
a c t i o n Õ (Nouveaux Horizons, No 2, 1991, p. 5) in
the same sense they are qualified as cUlamas of
the Sultan closer to the Ummayad period than
to oursÕ (Nouveaux Horizons, No 5, 1993, p. 4 ).
The men of brotherhood are also criticized as
having diffused an archaic Islam de spectacle i n
manipulating the collective religious imagina-
tion of the masses (Nouveaux Horizons, No 6
n.d., p. 6).
Islam in its orthodox form transformed itself
almost into an official Islam; the men of tradi-
tional religion became more or less civil ser-
vants of the State which aimed at monopoliza-
tion and manipulation of the political, social,
and cultural fields. Mosques, Qur'anic schools,
and institutes for higher education, are con-
trolled directly or indirectly by the authorities
in power. The emergence of new religious
actors emphasized the StateÕs control over reli-
gion and on reactivating all categories of tradi-
tional men of religion. This policy cannot halt
the development of an Islam of contestation
encouraged by a quest for identity, a precari-
ous economic and social situation, the obvious
social disparities and a discredited political sys-
tem. '
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